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Abstract
Does additional government spending improve the electoral chances of incumbent political
parties? This paper provides the ￿rst quasi-experimental evidence on this question. Our research
design exploits discontinuities in federal funding to local governments in Brazil around several
population cutoffs over the period 1982-1985. We show that extra ￿scal transfers resulted in a
20% increase in local government spending per capita, and an increase of about 10 percentage
points in the re-election probability of local incumbent parties. In the context of an agency model
of electoral accountability, as well as existing results indicating that the revenue jumps studied
here had positive impacts on education outcomes and earnings, these results suggest that expected
electoral rewards encouraged incumbents to spend additional funds in ways that were valued by
voters.
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11 Introduction
Does additional government spending improve the electoral chances of incumbent political par-
ties? Existing empirical studies shed little light on this question. In addition to coming to a variety
of conclusions regarding the relationship between spending and electoral outcomes￿both posi-
tive and negative correlations have been found￿the source of variation in government spending
is never identi￿ed, leading to two main concerns regarding causal interpretation of existing esti-
mates.1 The ￿rst problem, often acknowledged in the literature, is unobserved heterogeneity of
incumbent politicians, which might lead to omitted variable bias.2 The second problem, which
has been less appreciated in the literature, is reverse causality. This would arise, for example, if a
strong electoral challenge induced the incumbent to raise spending in the hopes of gaining electoral
support, leading to a downward biased estimate of the electoral effect of government spending.
Thispaperisthe￿rsttoaddresstheidenti￿cationchallengeinthisareausingaquasi-experimental
research design.3 While the ideal design would be one in which extra spending is randomized
across governments, such an experiment is unlikely to happen in practice. Instead, our study at-
tempts to approximate experimental conditions by exploiting variation in spending that is "as good
as" randomized locally around a population threshold (under relatively weak, and to some extent
testable, assumptions). Speci￿cally, we analyze the effect of additional local government spend-
ing (mainly on education, housing and urban infrastructure, and transportation) on the re-election
probability of local incumbent parties in the Brazilian municipal mayoral elections of 1988.4 Our
research design, ￿rst used in Litschig (2008a, 2011), takes advantage of the fact that a substantial
part of national tax revenue in Brazil is distributed to local governments strictly on the basis of
population, via a formula based on cutoffs. That is, if a municipality’s population is over the ￿rst
1Niskanen (1975), Peltzman (1992), Levitt and Snyder (1997), Matsusaka (2004), Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004),
Sakurai and Menezes-Filho (2008), SolØ-OllØ and Sorribas-Navarro (2008), and Jones, Meloni, and Tommasi (2009).
2Forexample, higherspendingincertainjurisdictionsmaybetheresultofmoregreedypoliticiansextractinghighertaxes
and "spending" more, but siphoning off most of that spending into their own pockets. The observed correlation between
government spending and electoral outcomes would then be biased downwards, since greedy politicians will provide fewer
public services per dollar extracted and hence face a lower equilibrium re-election probability (Jones, Meloni, and Tommasi
2009).
3Two existing papers (Manacorda, Miguel, and Vigorito 2011; Pop-Eleches and Pop-Eleches 2012) also use quasi-
experimental research designs to study aspects of this relationship, but our paper is different from them in two impor-
tant ways. First, while they examine particular forms of government spending￿namely cash or vouchers for computer
purchase￿we examine government spending on public services, such as education and transportation services. Second,
while their dependent variables measure self-reported political preferences based on surveys, we measure actual electoral
outcomes.
4Municipalities are the lowest level of government in Brazil (below the federal and state governments). The paper refers
to counties, communities, and municipalities interchangeably.
2population cutoff, it receives additional resources, over the second threshold a higher amount, and
so forth. The transfer mechanism results in discontinuities in per capita central government fund-
ing and local spending around the population cutoffs over the period 1982-1985.5 Our paper is the
￿rst to exploit these jumps to estimate electoral effects using regression discontinuity analysis.
Our key empirical result is that additional local government spending per capita of 20% im-
proved the re-election probability of local incumbent parties in the 1988 elections by about 10
percentage points. The validity of this result, and our analysis in general, hinges on the identifying
assumption that municipalities had (at most) only imprecise control over the number of local resi-
dents. We discuss in detail the plausibility of this untestable assumption in Section 3. The validity
of our analysis also requires an exclusion restriction, which is that additional funding affects the
probability of re-election only through local public spending and not through other channels, such
as local tax breaks.6 Litschig’s (2011) results￿partially reproduced here for convenience￿show
that additional transfers increased local public spending essentially one-for-one. That is, local own
revenue did not respond to extra transfers at all, so this exclusion restriction seems to hold.7
Our paper most directly contributes to the empirical literature analyzing the electoral impact of
government spending at the subnational level.8 As mentioned above, existing empirical evidence
on electoral effects of government spending is mixed, with several studies even ￿nding negative
correlations. Such a negative correlation between government spending and electoral outcomes
was originally found by Niskanen (1975) and Peltzman (1992) at the state level in the U.S. and
con￿rmed in subsequent work by Matsusaka (2004). In contrast, several other recent studies have
found a positive correlation between government spending and electoral outcomes (Akhmedov and
Zhuravskaya 2004; Sakurai and Menezes-Filho 2008; Jones, Meloni, and Tommasi 2009).9
5We use the 1982-1985 period because, starting in 1988, of￿cial population estimates were updated annually, and so
the magnitude of the variation in funding at the cutoffs was signi￿cantly reduced (Supplementary Law no 59/1988). In
addition, there is strong evidence of manipulation of the 1991 estimates, which determined transfers through the entire
decade of the 1990s and beyond (Litschig 2008b).
6Local governments were running essentially balanced budgets at the time so the extra transfers were neither saved nor
used to pay back existing liabilities.
7The result that spending increases essentially one-for-one with extra transfers is referred to as the "￿ypaper effect" and
has been found in many previous studies on intergovernmental grants and local spending, as reviewed in Hines and Thaler
(1996) for example. The result is perhaps not very surprising for the relatively small local governments considered in this
study, since they collect only about 6% of total revenue from their own residents and therefore have only little room to give
tax reductions. We cannot say whether such low own-revenue collection represents an optimal choice or whether it re￿ects
an inability to raise more revenue locally.
8For cross-country evidence see Brender and Drazen (2008) for example.
9In addition, positive correlations between certain budget categories, such as investment expenditures, and electoral
outcomes have been found by Brender (2003), Veiga and Veiga (2007), and Drazen and Eslava (2010).
3Two papers, of which we are aware, deal with the issue of reverse causality using an IV ap-
proach, instrumenting for spending in a given district with spending outside the district (but inside
the state or region containing the district). The ￿rst is Levitt and Snyder’s (1997) pioneering work,
which ￿nds that federal spending bene￿ts U.S. House of Representative incumbents. The other pa-
per is by SolØ-OllØ and Sorribas-Navarro (2008), who investigate electoral effects of capital grants
in Spain. They ￿nd that incumbent parties in both grantor and grantee (recipient) governments
bene￿t electorally from capital grants, although only when they are politically aligned. The key
identifying assumptions in both papers are that spending outside the district is not correlated with
other factors that also affect electoral outcomes within the district, and that spending outside the
district has no direct impact on electoral outcomes within the district except through in￿uencing
within-district spending.
There are several causal mechanisms that might explain the electoral effect we document in this
study. The ￿rst is that voters rewarded incumbents for using at least part of additional revenues to
improve public services, as predicted by classical political agency models (Barro 1973; Ferejohn
1986; Persson and Tabellini 2000; Besley 2006). As we discuss in Section 3 below, positive
electoral and public service effects together are consistent with a model in which rational voters
are imperfectly informed about the state of the budget￿that is, which side of the cutoff they are
on.10 In this model, windfall revenues are also associated with increased rent extraction by the
incumbent, but the re-election effect is driven by improved public services.
Evidence on whether this mechanism could have been at work in Brazil has been provided by
Litschig (2008a, 2011) based on the same research design used in this paper. The direct evidence
on public service improvements he ￿nds is mixed: while there is some indication that student-
teacher ratios in local primary school systems fell, there is little evidence that housing and urban
development spending affected housing conditions. Nevertheless, direct evidence on public ser-
vice provision is dif￿cult to interpret, as it is unclear exactly which public services one should
expect to increase. For this reason, Litschig also examines indirect evidence and ￿nds that extra
public spending indeed had a statistically and economically signi￿cant positive effect on education
10Positive electoral effects and public service effects are also consistent with a model in which rational voters are imper-
fectlyinformedaboutthequalityofincumbents(insteadofthestateofthebudget, asinourmodel), andtheyuseinformation
about public service provision as a signal of future behavior and vote (prospectively) accordingly (see Drazen and Eslava
2010). We choose a model of imperfect information regarding the state of the budget because it is more applicable to our
empirical setting (see Section 3). We are grateful to Allan Drazen for his comments in this regard.
4outcomes. In line with the impacts on human capital, the poverty rate was reduced, while income
per capita gains were positive but not statistically signi￿cant.11
A second mechanism that may have linked government spending to re-election in the setting
we examine is patronage, or "direct material inducements targeted to individuals and small groups
of citizens whom politicians know to be highly responsive to such side-payments and willing to
surrender their vote for the right price" (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007: 2). We ￿nd this eminently
plausible, though we think the magnitude of the education and income gains in Litschig (2008a,
2011) are not consistent with patronage being the only causal mechanism at work in our case.
A third mechanism that could potentially account for the electoral effect we ￿nd is political
selection. According to the model proposed in Brollo, Nannicini, Perotti, and Tabellini (2010),
expected extra transfers and associated rents might have led inferior candidates to run for of￿ce,
which in turn could have improved re-election prospects of incumbents.12 However, political
selection cannot account for the electoral effect in our study period because the extra funding
only lasted from 1982 until the end of 1985; by the time of the election in 1988, the funding
discontinuities between treatment and comparison groups had long disappeared and would not
reappear. Extra rents could therefore not have drawn inferior candidates into the 1988 race for the
mayor’s of￿ce in our setting.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background on the political context of the
1988 Brazilian elections, the public services provided by local governments, and their ￿nancing.
Section 2 also gives a description of the revenue sharing mechanism we examine. In Section 3,
we present a simple retrospective voting model to frame our work, and we discuss the identifying
assumptions for a causal interpretation of our estimates. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5
discussestheestimationapproach, andSection6evaluatestheinternalvalidityofthestudy. Section
7 presents the empirical results. We conclude with a discussion of limitations and extensions.
11Caselli and Michaels (2009) also look at household income as an indirect summary measure of public service levels in
their study of oil-￿nanced local public spending increases in Brazil. They report statistically signi￿cant but quantitatively
small impacts on average income in the bottom two quintiles of the income distribution. For income per capita, they ￿nd
positive yet insigni￿cant effects.
12In their empirical analysis, Brollo et al. (2010) build on Litschig (2008a, 2011) by using the same funding discontinu-
ities as we do, albeit in a later period, and also ￿nd positive effects on re-election rates of incumbent mayors. They make
it relatively clear that our paper, not theirs, is the ￿rst to use the funding discontinuities to look at electoral effects. See the
last paragraph on page 3 in the 2010 version of their paper. They use the audit reports in Ferraz and Finan (2008, 2010),
to show that municipalities that got a windfall of the same unrestricted funds analyzed here also experienced a roughly
proportional increase in public management irregularities.
52 Background
2.1 Political context and party re-election
Our goal is to estimate the effect of additional local public spending on the re-election probability
of local incumbent parties in the Brazilian municipal mayoral elections of 1988. For a variety of
reasons, the 1988 local executive elections represent a dif￿cult environment in which to ￿nd an
electoral effect, so that this might be considered a "least likely" case (Eckstein 1975).13 To begin
with, because of weak term limit rules, incumbent mayors could not be individually re-elected to
serve consecutive terms, although they could be elected again after skipping one term. In a directly
consecutive term, citizens could only re-elect the party of the mayor, which is how we code our
dependent variable (1 for re-election, 0 otherwise). Satisfaction with parties was particularly low,
however, and party identi￿cation in Brazil faces particularly strong challenges in general (Kinzo
1993; Shidlo 1998). As MoisØs (1993: 577) puts it, ￿Brazilians don’t vote for parties, they vote for
people.￿ In fact, public opinion surveys show that the percentage of the population agreeing that in
its own vote choice, ’the candidate’s party is the decisive factor’ had declined from 43% in 1982
to 24% in 1986, and to 18% in 1988 (Muszynski and Teixeria Mendes 1990: 64, cited in Ames
1994: 95). Perhaps not surprisingly, party switching by politicians in Brazil was rampant around
this time: Mainwaring (1991) reports that during the 1987-1990 Congress, about one-third of the
559 representatives switched parties.
Another complication is that the 1988 local elections in Brazil were held in a period of great
political change in the country. Most importantly, the elections were one of the culminating events
of Brazil’s extended transition to democracy. The military had ruled the country since 1964, and
over the course of the 1980s had gradually loosened and lost control. In 1985, the party of the
dictatorship, the PDS14, had lost the presidency to the major opposition party PMDB15 (though
this was not on the basis of a popular election). The 1988 elections would thus be the ￿rst in over
two decades in which the PDS was not in control of the central government.
Change at the national level had been re￿ected at the local level. As Table 1 shows, the PDS
had won mayoral elections in almost two-thirds of the municipalities in 1982, to go along with its
13Footnote 5 explains why we do not explore electoral effects of these transfers in later years.
14PDS stands for Partido DemocrÆtico Social.
15Partido do Movimiento DemocrÆtico Brasileiro.
6control of the central government. However, when mayoral elections were held in the state capitals
and other select municipalities in 1985, the party essentially disappeared from major urban areas,
the result of a party split (in which the PFL was formed) and widespread rejection of conservative
parties. Smith (1986) reports that the conservative PDS, PFL16, and PTB17 only won 28.2 percent
of the vote in the 1985 mayoral elections. This decline would continue in 1988, when PDS candi-
dates would be elected to the mayor’s of￿ce in a mere 10% of municipalities (see Table 1), leaving
a void that was ￿lled by an explosion of new parties. While the period of the dictatorship had
seen electoral "competition" limited to only a few parties, voters in 1988 chose from 31 political
parties￿sixteen of which were winners somewhere in the country￿to elect mayors in about 4000
municipalities.
2.2 Local public services and their ￿nancing
These local elections were important to voters because municipal budgets in Brazil are essential to
many locally provided public services. For example, public provision of elementary education in
the early 1980s was for the most part a joint responsibility of state and local governments, while
the federal government was primarily involved in ￿nancing and standard setting. In 1980, 55%
of all elementary school students in Brazil were enrolled in state administered schools, 31% in
municipality schools, and the remaining 14% in private schools. In small and rural municipalities,
such as those considered here, the proportion of students in schools managed by local governments
was 74%, while the proportions for state-run and private schools were 24% and 2% respectively
(World Bank 1985).
In all, over our study period of 1982-1985, local governments managed about 17% of public
resources in Brazil (Shah 1991), about four percent of GDP, with 20% of local budgets going to
education and similar shares to housing and urban infrastructure, and transportation spending, as
shown in Table 2.18 Most of these resources accrued to the local governments through intergov-
ernmental transfers, since municipalities have never collected much in the way of taxes. The most
important among these transfers was the federal Fundo de Participa￿ªo dos Munic￿pios (FPM),
16Partido da Frente Liberal.
17Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro.
18Local governments also provided some primary health care services (about 10% of local budgets). Local welfare
assistance was close to negligible.
7a largely unconditional revenue sharing grant funded by federal income and industrial products
taxes.19 This grant accounted for about 50% of the revenue of the municipalities in our analysis,
as shown in Table 2.
2.3 Mechanics of revenue sharing
In order to estimate the electoral response to public spending increases, we exploit variation in
FPM funding at several population cutoffs using regression-discontinuity (RD) analysis. The crit-
ical feature of the FPM revenue-sharing mechanism for the purposes of our analysis is Decree
1881/81, which stipulates that transfer amounts depend on county population in a discontinuous
fashion. Morespeci￿cally, based on countypopulation estimates, pope, countiesare assigned a co-
ef￿cient k D k.pope/, where k(.) is a step function of population. For counties with up to 10’188
inhabitants, the coef￿cient is 0.6; from 10’189 to 13’584 inhabitants, the coef￿cient is 0.8; and so
forth. The coef￿cient k.pope/ determines the share of total FPM resources, revt, distributed to








This equation makes it clear that local population estimates should be the only determinant of
cross-municipality variation in FPM funding. Exact county population estimates are only available
for census years or years when a national population count is conducted. Transfers were allocated
based on 1980 census population from 1982 (the ￿rst year the 1980 census ￿gures were used)
until 1985.20 Previously, from 1976 to 1981, the transfers had been based on extrapolations from
the 1960 and 1970 censuses, produced by the national statistical agency, IBGE.21 Likewise, from
1986 to 1988, the transfers were also based on such extrapolations, this time based on 1970 and
1980 census population ￿gures.22 As a result of the update in 1986, the funding discontinuities
19The one condition is that municipalities must spend 25 percent of the transfers on education. This constraint is usually
considered non-binding, in that municipalities typically spend about 20% of their total revenue on education. It is not clear
how this provision was enforced in practice, since there is no clear de￿nition of education expenditures and accounting
information provided by local governments was not systematically veri￿ed.
20The 1985 of￿cial estimates were already based on extrapolations which resulted in minor changes compared to the 1980
census numbers.
21The methodology used by the statistical agency in principle ensures that population estimates are consistent between
municipalities, states, and the updated population estimate for the country as a whole (Instituto Brasileiro de Geogra￿a e
Estat￿stica 2002).
22Beginning in 1989 the population estimates were updated on a yearly basis.
8for those municipalities around the cutoffs based on the 1980 census disappeared because many
municipalities changed brackets due to decreases or, more often, increases in their population
relative to 1980.23 The "treatment" therefore consists of a (presumably) unexpected temporary
funding windfall to the municipal budget, which lasted for four years from the beginning of 1982
through the end of 1985.
While this design of the revenue sharing mechanism is fortunate for our scienti￿c purposes, it
also represents somewhat of a puzzle: why would politicians allocate resources based on objective
criteria, such as population, rather than use discretion? The answer to this question lies in the po-
litical agenda of the military dictatorship which came to power in 1964. As detailed by Hagopian
(1996), one of the major objectives of the military was to wrest control over resources from the
traditional political elite and at the same time to depoliticize public service provision. The creation
of a revenue sharing fund for the munic￿pios based on an objective criterion of need, population,
was part of this greater agenda. It re￿ected an attempt to break with the clientelistic practice of the
traditional elite, which manipulated public resources to the bene￿t of narrowly de￿ned constituen-
cies.
The reason for allocating resources by brackets￿that is, as a step function of population as
in Decree 1881/81￿is less clear. One explanation could be that compared to a linear schedule,
for example, the bracket design mutes incentives for local of￿cials at the interior of the bracket to
tinker with their population ￿gures or to contest the accuracy of the estimates in order to get more
transfers. A related question is where the exact cutoffs come from￿that is, why 10’188, 13’584,
16’980, and so forth? While we were unable to trace the origin of these cutoffs precisely, we know
roughly how they came about. The initial legislation from 1967 created cutoffs at multiples of
2’000 up to 10’000, then every 4’000 up to 30’000 and so forth. The legislation also stipulated that
these cutoffs should be updated proportionally with population growth in Brazil.24 The cutoffs
were thus presumably updated twice, once with the census of 1970 and then with the census of
1980, which explains the "odd" numbers. It is noteworthy that the thresholds during our study
period are still equidistant from one another, the distance being 6’792 for the ￿rst seven cutoffs
23To be clear, there are no economically or statistically signi￿cant differences in FPM transfers between the treatment
and comparison group (those around the ￿rst three cutoffs based on the 1980 census) from 1986 onwards.
24Supplementary Law No. 35, 1967, Art. 1, Paragraphs 2 and 4.
9(except for the second cutoff, which lies exactly halfway in between the ￿rst and the third cutoffs).
Perhaps most important for our analysis is that over the period we study, the transfers were in
fact allocated as stipulated in Decree 1881/81. Figure 1 plots cumulative FPM transfers over the
period 1982 to 1985 against 1982 of￿cial population. The horizontal lines correspond to the modal
levels of cumulative transfers for each bracket in our data. The ￿gure shows that funding jumps by
about 1’320’000 Reais (2008 prices) or about 1’000’000 international US$ at each threshold over
this period.25 Observations that appear above or below the horizontal lines are most likely due to
measurement error, because transfer data in this ￿gure are self-reported by municipalities, rather
than based on administrative records of the Ministry of Finance, which are not available for the
period considered.26 The cumulative transfer differential over the period 1982-1985 corresponds
to about 2.5% of annual GDP in rural areas of the country and about 1.4% of annual GDP in urban
areas for the counties in our estimation sample (Table 2).
Although the funding jump is the same in absolute terms at each cutoff, the jump declines in
per capita terms the higher the cutoff. As is apparent from Figure 1, funding jumps by about R$
130 (US$ 95) per capita at the ￿rst threshold, R$ 97 (US$ 70) at the second, R$ 78 (US$ 57)
at the third, and declines monotonically for the following cutoffs. Immediately to the left of the
￿rst three cutoffs, per capita FPM funding is about R$ 390 (286 US$), and this amount declines
monotonically for the following cutoffs. For the ￿rst three cutoffs the funding increase per capita
is therefore from the same baseline level and represents about 33% at the ￿rst, 25% at the second,
and 20% at the third cutoff. Though the differences are not great, this means that the treatment
in terms of additional per capita funding is not exactly the same across these cutoffs. However,
since there are likely to be economies of scale in the provision of local public services￿that is,
unit costs decline with scale￿the differences in treatment across cutoffs might be even smaller
than what the per capita funding jumps would suggest. It thus seems reasonable to expect similar
treatment effects around these cutoffs, as further discussed in Section 5 below.
25The 2005 Real/$ PPP exchange rate was about 1.36 (World Bank 2008).
26For later periods the data is available from the Ministry of Finance, and in these data there is essentially no variation in
FPM transfers for a given state and population bracket.
103 Theoretical framework and identi￿cation
3.1 Theoretical framework
In order to frame our analysis, this section presents a simple rational retrospective voting model
in the spirit of Barro (1973), Ferejohn (1986), and Persson and Tabellini (2000).27 While our
model captures essential elements and predictions of these classic agency models of electoral
accountability￿highlighting the implications of electoral incentives for government spending and
public service provision￿we develop the model in a way that facilitates comparison with our re-
search design and allows us to illustrate how our work relates to existing empirical studies. We
particularly draw on the model of Jones, Meloni, and Tommasi (2009), which we slightly adapt for
our purposes.
We consider an incumbent mayor who values current political rents from holding of￿ce r
(purely private consumption), and whose sel￿shness is parameterized by ￿, ranging from 0 (un-
sel￿sh or benevolent type) to in￿nity (extremely sel￿sh type). We assume that ￿ is known to voters
and might vary across municipalities. The incumbent also cares about future rents R, which be-
come available through rent-sharing within the party if and only if the party is re-elected (R might
also include an ego rent such as prestige for keeping the mayor’s of￿ce in the hands of the party).28
Party re-election happens with probability p. The incumbent’s welfare is therefore given by:
W D ￿w.r/ C pR (1)
The incumbent spends revenue g on public services b; valued by the representative voter, and
rents r. We assume that the level of revenue is exogenous, to focus on the incumbent’s allocation
decision (between b and r) rather than extraction (from the voter’s private income). This assump-
tion, namely that government spending is ￿nanced exclusively through intergovernmental transfers
(or other windfall revenue), approximates reality at the local level of government for many coun-
27We focus on an agency model because we believe it captures the underlying dynamic of our research design, which
examines the effects of transfers over a certain period on an election in a later year. As discussed in the introduction, the
political selection model proposed by Brollo et al. (2010) cannot account for the electoral effect we ￿nd.
28If R becomes available only in the event of individual re-election in a later period (politicians could be re-elected after
skipping one term), the incumbent’s welfare is given by W D ￿w.r/ C E.R/ D ￿w.r/ C p￿R C .1 ￿ p/￿R, where ￿
denotes the probability of individual re-election if the party was re-elected and ￿ is the probability of re-election if the party
was not re-elected. As long as ￿ > ￿￿meaning that it is easier to get re-elected later if one’s own party was re-elected than
if it was not re-elected￿it pays for incumbents to provide public services while in of￿ce. See Drazen and Eslava (2010).
11tries, including Brazil (Rodden 2004). The budget constraint is therefore:
g D b C r (2)
The re-election probability p depends on the voter’s satisfaction with the incumbent’s perfor-
mance. Voter satisfaction is increasing in b: Voter satisfaction also has a random component ￿
to it, capturing uncertainty about the mapping from policy choices to electoral outcomes for the
incumbent. For simplicity, we assume that ￿ is distributed uniformly on the unit interval. Utility
of the voter is then given by:
U D u.b/ C ￿
The agency models of electoral accountability cited above assume that re-election depends on
whether or not the voter’s utility is above her ￿reservation utility￿. This, in turn, can depend on
whether the conditions for public good provision are good or bad. In Persson and Tabellini (2000,
chapter 4.4), for example, the focus is on exogenous conditions that lower or raise the cost of public
service provision. In our model, we focus on whether exogenous government revenue g is high
or low. This captures the essential element of our research design, which examines municipalities
around cutoffs where per capita ￿nancing jumps substantially. The parallel between the models is
straightforward: both low costs of service provision and high exogenous funding expand potential
service levels.
Whether or not the voter’s reservation utility takes into account the conditions for public service
provision depends on whether or not these conditions are known by the voter￿that is, by the
information environment of the model. If voters are perfectly informed about the conditions, they
adjust their reservation utility to take account of more or less favorable circumstances for the
incumbent. Alternatively, when voters do not know the conditions for public good provision (that
is, they are imperfectly informed), ￿the best they can do is to choose a non-state-contingent cutoff
level for their utility￿ (Persson and Tabellini 2000: 79). In other words, the reservation utility does
not depend on the state of the budget.
We believe it more plausible that at least a substantial fraction of voters, if not most, in munici-
palities close to the cutoffs in Brazil were not sure what side of the cutoff they were on and hence
12whether funding was high or low.29 It is useful to know in this context that illiteracy rates were
about 40% on average in the relatively small municipalities considered here (Table 2). Moreover,
access to exact population numbers and updated cutoffs was dif￿cult at the time due to limited
availability of information technology and there was no requirement for the local government to
make the level of FPM-funding public￿in contrast to project-speci￿c transfers received from the
central government. As such, we model voters’ reservation utility as not depending on g, and call




u.b/ C ￿ ￿ U
￿
(3)
In this type of model, when the reservation utility is not state-contingent, an incumbent’s re-
election probability and level of public service provision depend on the state in which he ￿nds
himself. In good states (if the cost for public service provision is low, or exogenous government
funding is high), the incumbent can provide enough public goods to meet the reservation utility
of the voter and get re-elected, as well as siphon off any remaining revenue for himself. In bad
states, however, providing the level of public goods necessary to meet the reservation utility is
not possible, so the incumbent allocates all revenue to rents and accepts defeat in the election.
This mechanism therefore generates positive correlations between the state variable, public service
provision, and re-election (Persson and Tabellini 2000, chapter 4.4).30
This same prediction is generated by our model, as can be seen by solving the incumbent’s
problem of choosing r and b to maximize (1) subject to (2) and (3). In order to obtain simple






29We have no direct evidence on how informed voters were about local budgets in the 1980s in Brazil. However, available
survey evidence for the U.S.￿a richer society with more mature democratic institutions￿suggests that voter information
about public budgets is generally very low. For example, only 6% of survey respondents in 1988 were able to answer
whether or not the size of the federal budget had increased over the preceding 8 years (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, Table
2.4, p.81).
30These positive correlations are partially robust to the information environment of the model. If voters are assumed to
have perfect information about the conditions for public service delivery (in contrast to our model), there is still a positive
correlation between the state variable and public service provision, but not between the state and re-election (Persson and
Tabellini 2000). A positive correlation between the state and re-election can, however, be generated even with voters’
perfect information about the state variable in a model of political selection, whereby higher rents attract lower quality
challengers who make it easier for the incumbent to retain of￿ce (Brollo, Nannicini, Perotti, and Tabellini 2010). As












The principal goal of this paper is to test whether
@p￿
@g is positive as predicted by our model.
Litschig (2008a, 2011) has provided both direct and indirect evidence on the comparative static
@b￿
@g .
Our simple framework also helps illustrate the advantages of our research design over other
existing studies, which are likely plagued by bias due to omitted variables and reverse causality.
For example, the omitted variable bias problem can be understood by considering a variant of the
model above with tax-￿nanced public spending￿realistic for state or national governments. In
such a model, higher spending might be the result of greedy politicians (higher ￿ types), who
extract higher taxes and political rents but provide less public service per dollar extracted, thus
having a lower equilibrium re-election probability (Jones, Meloni, and Tommasi 2009). The re-
verse causality problem, in turn, can be seen by examining the effect of U. A strong electoral
challenge could raise U and lower p, inducing the incumbent to raise spending in the hopes of
gaining electoral support.31
Heterogeneity in ￿ or U across jurisdictions would therefore likely lead to a downward biased
estimate of
@p￿
@g , and possibly even to the negative correlation between observed spending and
electoral outcomes found by Peltzman (1992) and other studies mentioned above. For studies
at the subnational level, the likely bias is upwards. Local jurisdictions that manage to expand
public spending￿essentially by extracting resources from the center￿might be those that are
better managed overall, leading to a spurious positive correlation of government spending with
electoral outcomes. With our research design, in contrast, unobservables related to the type of
incumbent or to the strength of the electoral challenge are unlikely to be problematic, because g is
"as good as" randomly assigned around the population cutoffs if municipalities had (at most) only
imprecise control over the number of local residents, as discussed in the next section.
31This is, admittedly, an incomplete argument since our model does not capture the effort and spending responses of
incumbents to more ￿erce electoral competition. Nevertheless, we believe the point is valid from an empirical perspective.
See Levitt and Snyder (1997) for a more extensive discussion.
143.2 Identi￿cation
The basic intuition behind the regression discontinuity approach is that, in the absence of program
manipulation, municipalities to the left of the treatment-determining population cutoff should pro-
vide valid counterfactual outcomes for counties on the right side of the cutoff (which received
additional resources). More formally, let Y denote an outcome variable at the municipality level
(party re-election, average schooling, or poverty rate), ￿ the (constant) treatment effect, D the in-
dicator function for treatment (additional resources), pop county population, c a particular cutoff,
f .pop/ a polynomial function of population, and u unobserved factors that affect outcomes. The
model is as follows:
Y D ￿D C f .pop/ C u
D D 1[pop > c]
If the potential regression functions E[YjD D 1; pop] and E[YjD D 0; pop] are both contin-
uous in population, or equivalently, if E[ujpop] is continuous, then the difference in conditional





E[Yjpop] D ￿ (4)




g C f .pop/ C u
g D ￿D C v
D D 1[pop > c]
where @Y
@g represents the causal effect of government spending g on Y, ￿ represents the jump in
spending that occurs at the cutoff, and v represents other factors that affect g: Under the continuity
32With heterogeneous treatment effects, the RD gap identi￿es the average treatment effect at the cutoff. See Lee (2008)
for an alternative interpretation of the treatment effect identi￿ed in this case as a weighted average of individual treatment
effects, where the weights re￿ect the ex ante probability that an individual·s score is realized close to the cutoff.
















If government spending is the only channel through which additional transfers operate (the
exclusion restriction), the ratio of jumps in Y and g identi￿es
@p￿
@g ; the impact of local public
spending on the re-election probability, and @b￿
@g ; the impact on public services. Reductions in local
taxes and corresponding increases in private spending would violate this exclusion restriction, for
example. However, local taxes do not seem to have responded to additional transfers. There is also
no evidence that state or federal levels of government altered other governmental transfers around
the cutoffs.
As emphasized in the introduction, we do not make the stronger￿and indeed implausible￿
assumption that the extra local public spending affected electoral prospects exclusively through
a particular channel, such as public service improvements. Indeed, it is very plausible that some
of the extra spending served to expand political patronage￿thus helping the incumbent political
party get re-elected￿and some of the extra cash might also have helped to keep some kids in
school. But the magnitude of the impacts on education and poverty discussed in Litschig (2011)
seem inconsistent with the hypothesis that only a small minority in the community bene￿ted from
the extra government spending. What these results suggest, therefore, is that expected electoral
rewards encouraged incumbents to spend at least part of additional revenues on public services
valued by voters at large.
The most important assumption for this study concerns the continuity of the potential regression
functions, or equivalently, the continuity of E[ujpop]; which gives the estimands in equations (4)
and (5) above a causal interpretation. Intuitively, the continuity assumption requires that unobserv-
ables, such as ￿ or U, vary smoothly as a function of population and, in particular, do not jump at
the cutoff. As shown in Lee (2008) and Lee and Lemieux (2009), suf￿cient for the continuity of
the regression functions (or the continuity of E[ujpop]) is the assumption that individual densities
of the treatment-determining variable are smooth. In our case, this assumption explicitly allows for
mayors or other agents in the municipality to have some control over their particular value of popu-
lation. As long as this control is imprecise, treatment assignment is randomized around the cutoff.
16In our case, the continuity of individual population density functions also directly ensures that
treatment status (extra transfers) is randomized close to the cutoff. (An additional concern would
be imperfect compliance with the treatment rule, but in our study period all eligible municipalities
received more FPM transfers, and none of the ineligible ones did.)
Howreasonableisthecontinuityassumptioninourcontext? LocalelitesinBrazilclearlyhadan
incentivetomanipulate, andpresumablyalsosomecontrolover, thenumberoftheirlocalresidents.
It seems implausible, however, that this control was perfect, so the key identifying assumption is
likely to hold here. It is also worth considering that under imperfect control, bringing people into
the municipality is risky because there is always the chance that on census day the counted number
falls just short of the cutoff and hence per capita funding actually falls. Moreover, even if local
eliteshadperfectcontroloverthenumberofresidentsintheirmunicipality, thelegislationspeci￿ed
that thresholds would be updated in accordance with population growth in the country as a whole
after the release of the 1980 census results. Put differently, local elites were unlikely to know the
exact locations of the new thresholds even if they wanted to manipulate their population count.
Still, one might worry that leaders in the central government had incentives to alter the cutoffs
to bene￿t local leaders they favored. It is unlikely, however, that this kind of manipulation would
have occurred. For example, in order for leaders at the central government level to have used
the cutoffs to bene￿t mayors of their party, there would have had to be places on the support of
the municipality population distribution where aligned municipalities had a systematically higher
density than other municipalities. It is noteworthy in this context that the thresholds are equidistant
from one another, making it even less likely that the thresholds were set in order to bene￿t leaders
of a certain type. In support of this contention, we show in Section 6 below that local governments
that were run by the PDS, the party of the authoritarian regime that was in control of the central
government until 1985, were not over-represented to the right of the cutoffs in our study period.33
A ￿nal potential concern is that other government policies are also related to the cutoffs speci-
￿ed in Decree 1881/81. If so, ￿ and @Y
@g would re￿ect the combined causal effect of extra funding
and other policies. To our knowledge, however, there are no other programs that use the same
cutoffs, although some government programs and policies do use other local population cutoffs for




amounts over the period 1982-1988 were taken from successive reports issued by the Federal Court
of Accounts. Data on local public budgets, including FPM transfers, are self-reported by county
of￿cials and compiled into reports by the Secretariat of Economics and Finance inside the federal
Ministry of Finance. The data from these reports were entered into spreadsheets using independent
double-entry processing. All public ￿nance data were converted into 2008 currency units using the
GDP de￿ator for Brazil and taking account of the various monetary reforms that occurred in the
country since 1980. Electoral data for the municipal executive 1982 and 1988 elections are from
the Supreme Electoral Tribunal.
As discussed below, we include as pre-treatment covariates the 1980 levels of municipality
income per capita, average years of schooling for individuals 25 years and older, the poverty head-
count ratio, the illiterate percentage of people over 14 years old, the infant mortality rate, the school
enrollment rate of 7- to 14-year-olds, and the percent of the municipal population living in urban
areas. Data on these 1980 municipality characteristics are based on the 25% sample of the cen-
sus and have been calculated by the national statistical agency (only a shorter census survey was
administered to 100% of the population).
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the variables used in the statistical analysis, as well as
otherinformationregardingrevenueandexpendituresinthemunicipalities. Thenumbersshowthat
FPM transfers are the most important source of revenue for the relatively small local governments
considered here, amounting to about 50% on average and 56% in rural areas. Table 2 also shows
that education spending accounts for about 20% of local budgets on average, with similar shares
going to housing and urban infrastructure, and transportation spending.
185 Estimation approach
Following Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw (2001) and Imbens and Lemieux (2008), our main
estimation approach is to use local linear regression in samples around the discontinuity, which
amounts to running simple linear regressions allowing for different slopes of the regression func-
tion in the neighborhood of the cutoff. Allowing for slope is particularly important in the present
application because per capita transfers are declining as population approaches the threshold from
below, and again declining after the threshold. Assuming that a similar pattern characterizes out-
comes as a function of population, a simple comparison of means for counties above and below
the cutoff would provide downward biased estimates of the treatment effect. We follow the sug-
gestions by Imbens and Lemieux (2008) and use a rectangular kernel (i.e. equal weight for all
observations in the estimation sample).
Because there are relatively few observations in a local neighborhood of each threshold, our RD
analysis also makes use of more distant municipalities. The disadvantage of this approach is that
the speci￿cation of the function f .pop/, which determines the slopes and curvature of the regres-
sion line, becomes particularly important. To ensure that our ￿ndings are not driven by functional
form assumptions, we present most estimation results from linear speci￿cations in the discontinu-
ity samples, adding nonlinear speci￿cations as a robustness check. We supplement the local linear
estimates with higher order polynomial speci￿cations, using an extended support, and we choose
the order of the polynomial such that it best matches the local linear estimates in the discontinuity
samples. Our main approach thus combines the advantage of local linear regression￿comparing
municipalities close to the cutoff, where local randomization of the treatment is most likely to hold
but the variance of the estimates is relatively high￿with the main advantage of using an extended
support, namely sample size, which helps to reduce standard errors.
Intheanalysisthatfollows, wefocusparticularlyonthe￿rstthreepopulationcutoffs(c1 D10’188,
c2 D13’584, and c3 D16’980). At subsequent cutoffs the variation in FPM transfers is too small
to affect municipal overall budgets, and hence there is no "￿rst stage" in terms of overall resources
available for the municipality, as shown in Section 7 below. While we present results for the ￿rst
three cutoffs individually, we also pool the municipalities across these cutoffs in order to gain
19statistical power.
Pooling requires the treatment intensity to be of comparable magnitude in order to interpret the
size of estimated impacts.34 As discussed above, although the funding jump is about 1’320’000
Reais (2008 prices) or about 1’000’000 international US$ at each cutoff, the treatment in terms
of additional per capita funding is not the same across cutoffs. However, the differences across
the ￿rst three cutoffs are not that large, and since there are likely to be economies of scale in
the provision of local public services￿that is, unit costs decline with scale￿the differences in
treatment across cutoffs are likely even smaller than what the differences in per capita funding
jumps suggest.
The effects presented in this paper (as in any regression discontinuity analysis) apply only to the
units near the relevant cutoffs￿in our case, the municipalities near the population cutoffs. With
similar treatment intensity it seems reasonable to expect similar treatment effects at least around
the ￿rst few cutoffs, a testable hypothesis for which we ￿nd support below. Because our results
are qualitatively similar across the ￿rst three cutoffs, it seems likely that the effects presented
here generalize at least to the subpopulation of municipalities in the approximate population range
8’500-18’700, which represents about 30% of Brazilian municipalities at the time.
The speci￿cation we use to test the null hypothesis of common (average) effects across the
￿rst three cutoffs is as follows. Let segj denote the four integers (7’500, 11’800, 15’100, and
23’772) that bound and partition the population support into three segments; Yms an outcome in
municipality m, state s; zms a set of pre-treatment covariates; as a ￿xed effect for each state;
and ums an error term for each county. Neither covariates nor state ￿xed effects are needed for
identi￿cation. We include them to guard against chance correlations with treatment status and to
increase the precision of the estimates. The testing speci￿cation for a given percentage distance p
34Treatment effects need not be the same across cutoffs. If treatment effects are heterogeneous, the pooled estimates
identify an average treatment effect across cutoffs.
20from the cutoffs is then:
Yms D [￿11[popms > c1] C ￿10popms C ￿11.popms ￿ c1/1[popms > c1]]11p (6)
C [￿21[popms > c2] C ￿20popms C ￿21.popms ￿ c2/1[popms > c2]]12p




￿ j1[segj￿1 < popms ￿ segj]1jp C ￿zms C as C ums
seg0 D 7500;seg1 D 11800;seg2 D 15100;seg3 D 23772
1jp D 1[cj.1 ￿ p/ < popms < cj.1 C p/]; j D 1;2;3I p D 2;3;4%
Figure 2 illustrates the estimation approach. We fail to reject the null hypotheses ￿1 D ￿2 D ￿3 at
conventional levels of signi￿cance for all outcomes and in all speci￿cations.
For the pooled analysis, we need to make observations comparable in terms of the distance from
their respective cutoff. To do this, we rescale population to equal zero at the respective thresholds
within each of the ￿rst three segments, and then use the scaled variable, Xms (municipality m in
state s), for estimation purposes:
Xms D popms ￿ 10188 if seg0 < popms ￿ seg1
popms ￿ 13564 if seg1 < popms ￿ seg2
popms ￿ 16980 if seg2 < popms ￿ seg3
Yms D ￿1[Xms > 0]1p C [￿10Xms C ￿11Xms1[Xms > 0]]11p (7)
C [￿20Xms C ￿21Xms1[Xms > 0]]12p




￿ j1[segj￿1 < popms ￿ segj]1jp C ￿zms C as C ums
1p D 11p C 12p C 13p
Essentially this equation allows for six different slopes, one each on either side of the three cutoffs,
21but imposes a common effect ￿. Under the continuity assumption above, the pooled treatment ef-
fect is given by lim
1#0
E[YjX D 1]￿ E[YjX D 0] D ￿. Both the pooled treatment effect and effects
at individual cutoffs are estimated using observations within successively larger neighborhoods
(larger p) around the cutoff in order to assess the robustness of the results.
6 Internal validity checks
Since extensive manipulation of the population estimates on which FPM allocations were based
would cast serious doubts on the internal validity of the research design, we check for any evidence
of sorting, notably discontinuous population distributions. Figure 3 plots the histogram for 1982
of￿cial municipality population up to the seventh cutoff. The bin-width in this histogram (283), is
set to ensure that the various cutoffs coincide with bin limits. That is, no bin counts observations
from both sides of any cutoff. Visual inspection reveals no discontinuities and the null hypothesis
of a smooth density cannot be rejected at conventional signi￿cance levels for any of the ￿rst six
cutoffs according to the density test suggested by McCrary (2008).35
In Table 3, we estimate equation (7) pooled across the ￿rst three cutoffs for a host of pre-
treatment outcomes and other covariates. The results show that, in the samples with population of
+/- 2 or 3 percentage points around the cutoffs, there is no statistical evidence of discontinuities
in the 1980 pre-treatment covariates mentioned above. Nor is there statistical evidence of pre-
treatment differences in the total public budget or its main components. While the 1981 public
￿nancereportsdonotdisaggregatetransfersintoFPMtransfersandothercategories, FPMtransfers
represent the bulk of current transfers, and so any discontinuities in pre-treatment FPM transfers
should show up in 1981 current or capital transfers. Table 3 shows that such is not the case.
In the larger samples that include municipalities within +/- 4 to 6 percentage points, some indi-
vidualdiscontinuitiesinTable3arestatisticallysigni￿cant. Thishappensmostlyduetolargerpoint
estimates compared to the smaller bandwidths, rather than lower standard errors, which suggests
that these signi￿cant results might re￿ect a speci￿cation error.36 Results from quadratic speci￿ca-
tions (not shown but available on request) con￿rm this view: virtually none of the pre-treatment
35The estimates (and standard errors) are, for the ￿rst to sixth cutoffs respectively, -0.085 (0.098), -0.002 (0.112), 0.152
(0.135), 0.071 (0.167), -0.041 (0.253), 0.324 (0.344). Separate density plots for each cutoff are available on request.
36See for example Lee and Lemieux (2009) for more discussion on this point.
22differences found in the 4 and 5 percent samples in Table 3 remain statistically signi￿cant, due to
bothlowerestimatesandhigherstandarderrors. Moreover, allF-testsshowninTable3failtoreject
the joint null hypotheses of no discontinuities in any pre-treatment covariate at conventional levels
of signi￿cance (lowest p-value is 0.26).37 In other words, from a statistical point of view, there
is no evidence that treatment group municipalities were systematically different in terms of local
development or overall public resources from municipalities in the marginal comparison group in
the pre-treatment period.
Nonetheless, the point estimates for education outcomes and public revenues are all positive.
Moreover, some of these estimates are of the same order of magnitude as those found in the post-
treatment period as further discussed below, suggesting that treatment group municipalities might
already have been somewhat better off than those in the comparison group as of 1980. In Section
7 below we show that the estimated effects are robust to the inclusion of relevant pre-treatment
covariates, including the four pre-treatment education and earnings outcomes shown in Table 3.
7 Estimation results
This section starts out by demonstrating that FPM transfers increased local public spending per
capita by about 20%, with no evidence of crowding out own revenue or other revenue sources.
This result was established in Litschig (2011), but for convenience some text, tables, and ￿gures
are reproduced here. The second subsection presents the original result of this paper, which is that
the probability of re-election increased by about 10 percentage points. The same subsection also
presents robustness checks for the re-election result.
All the tables below show results for the ￿rst two cutoffs pooled and the ￿rst three cutoffs
pooled. The tables present results for successively larger samples around the cutoffs (typically 2,
3, 4, and 15%) and for each sample with and without covariates. The discussion will focus on
the pooled estimates, because F-tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of homogenous effects at
the three cutoffs at conventional levels of signi￿cance for all outcomes and in all speci￿cations.
Among the pooled estimates, those that control for covariates (including pre-treatment outcomes)
37The test of the joint null hypotheses of no jumps in pre-treatment covariates is done by stacking these variables and
running a joint estimation of individual discontinuities (Lee and Lemieux, 2009).
23are the most reliable because they control for chance correlations with treatment status. They
are also the most precisely estimated, because the covariates absorb some of the variation in the
outcome measures.
7.1 Impacts on total spending, own revenue and other revenues
Table 4 gives estimates of the jump in total local public spending per capita over the 1982-1985
period. The pooled estimates in the ￿rst two rows suggest that per capita public spending increased
by about 20 percent at the thresholds. The magnitude of the jump is roughly consistent with the
size of FPM transfers in local budgets (about 50%) and the jump in per capita FPM transfers at
the cutoffs (about 33% for the 10’188 cutoff and less for subsequent cutoffs).38 This result is also
borne out when we estimate the effect of FPM funding per capita on total per capita spending
directly, using the treatment indicator I[X > 0] as the instrument. Estimates (not shown but
available on request) are almost always at 1 or above, statistically different from zero, and virtually
never statistically different from unity.
Two points about Table 4 are worth noting. First, the table shows that for larger municipalities
around the fourth cutoff, the increase in FPM transfers was too small to affect their overall budget,
and hence there was no "￿rst stage" in terms of total spending.39 One could argue that the 4th
cutoff could be used as well because, although not signi￿cant, the point estimates are similar to
those at preceding cutoffs. While this is a sensible argument, estimates around higher cutoffs are
not pursued here for the sake of brevity and ease of interpretation of the estimated impacts. The
second point worth noting is that the included pre-treatment covariates are signi￿cant predictors of
per capita spending, thus lowering standard errors. Pretreatment covariates also seem to be weakly
related to the treatment indicators although the change in point estimates is relatively minor.
Panel B of Figure 4 presents graphical evidence of the discontinuity in public spending. Each
dot represents the average residual from a regression of per capita spending on state and segment
38To see this, let g denote total spending, R total revenue, F FPM funding and O other funding. Since municipalities







R . If 1O D 0, as shown below,
and F
R D 0:5 on average, as shown in Table 2, then 1R
R D 33% ￿ 50% D 16:5%: The estimates in Table 4 are somewhat
larger, perhaps because municipalities with missing FPM information rely more heavily on FPM funding, in which case F
R
might be more like 0:6, or simply by chance. Note that proportional changes at the cutoff are identical whether or not the
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39At the 5th cutoff the discontinuity estimates are much more variable and they are nowhere near statistical signi￿cance.
24dummies. These are included to absorb some of the variation in per capita spending and make the
jump at the cutoff more easily visible. For example, the ￿rst dot to the left of zero represents the
residual spending per capita for all municipalities within one percentage point (in terms of popula-
tion) to the left of one of the ￿rst three population thresholds.40 To demonstrate the correspondence
between panel B of Figure 4 and the results in Table 4, if instead of ￿tting two straight regression
lines through the ten dots on either side of the cutoff, this ￿gure were to ￿t two lines through the
￿rst two dots on either side of the cutoff, the result would roughly illustrate the jump estimated in
column 1 of Table 4 for pooled cutoffs 1-3 in the two percent neighborhood without covariates.
With this in mind, the ￿gure shows clear evidence of a discontinuity in total spending at the pooled
cutoff, and it additionally shows that the discontinuity is visually robust irrespective of the width
of the neighborhood examined.
Figure 4 also graphically represents the results for FPM transfers (panel A), other revenue,
which are composed of other federal and state government transfers (panel C), and own revenues
(panel D), all cumulative over the period 1982-1985. It is worth noting that both the regression
functions for public spending per capita and FPM per capita exhibit a jump at the cutoff and slope
downward to the left and to the right of the cutoff. At the same time, Figure 4 shows that there
are no discontinuities in either own revenue or other revenues. This suggests that the effects on
party re-election, education, and poverty discussed below can be attributed to local spending on
public services, rather than additional private spending associated with local tax breaks. That is,
the exclusion restriction discussed in Section 3 seems to hold. Statistical analysis con￿rms this
conclusion but is not presented here to save space.
7.2 Impact on the probability of re-election
Table 5 presents estimation results for the party re-election indicator based on the linear probability
model. Most of the pooled estimates shown in rows 1 and 2 fall in the range 0.7 to 0.13, with a
modal value of around 10 percentage points. The estimates at individual cutoffs are positive almost
without exception, although they are more variable, which likely re￿ects smaller sample sizes.
While most of the estimates from individual cutoffs are not signi￿cantly different from zero, the
40The null hypothesis that population means are equal for two sub-bins within each bin cannot be rejected, suggesting
that the graph does not oversmooth the data (Lee and Lemieux 2009).
25pooling across cutoffs c1 and c2, as well as c1; c2 and c3, yields statistically signi￿cant estimates
(at 5%) when we use an extended support (p D 10%;15%). Importantly, we reach statistical
signi￿cance not through higher point estimates, but through a monotonic reduction in standard
errors of at least 50 percent compared to the narrowest neighborhoods. The same pattern of results
arises when state dummies are included (Table 6) or with probit estimates (results available on
request).
We also estimate the impact on re-election using quadratic and cubic polynomial speci￿cations
of the running variable as further robustness checks. These estimates, presented in Table 7, fall in
the same range as those in Tables 5 and 6. Most of the nonlinear estimates are not statistically sig-
ni￿cant because standard errors increase substantially compared to the linear model (the standard
error is sometimes twice the size of the corresponding linear speci￿cation). We use an F-test of
the joint hypotheses that the coef￿cients on the quadratic and cubic population terms on either side
of the cutoff are zero￿that is, whether linearity of the population polynomial can be rejected. For
neighborhoods up to and including 10% there is virtually no statistical evidence against the null
hypothesis of a linear model. In addition to the a priori case for a linear speci￿cation based on
the relationship between population and spending per capita shown in panel B of Figure 4, these
statistical test results further corroborate our focus on the linear estimates and standard errors.
Figure 5 presents graphical evidence of the discontinuity in re-election rates. Each dot rep-
resents the average residual from a regression of the re-election indicator on state and segment
dummies and a dummy indicating whether the county was run by a PDS mayor from 1982 to
1988.41 The jump in solid lines at the cutoff approximately corresponds to the estimate of the
discontinuity in the ￿rst row and sixth column of Table 6. The jump in dashed lines at the cutoff
approximately corresponds to the estimate of the discontinuity in the ￿rst row and sixth column of
Table 7. As with the jump in FPM funding and total spending per capita above, Figure 5 shows that
the jump in the re-election probability is visually robust irrespective of the width of the neighbor-
hood examined, although there is visibly more variance in this ￿gure than in FPM funding or total
41Other covariates such as average years of schooling for individuals 25 years and older, county income per capita,
poverty headcount ratio, illiterate percentage of over 15 year olds, infant mortality, school enrollment of 7 to 14 year olds
and percent of population living in urban areas do not alter the estimate of interest nor do they help reduce its standard
error.
26per capita spending (Panels A and B of Figure 4).42 In line with this graphical evidence, estimates
of the discontinuity for neighborhoods not shown in Tables 5, 6 and 7 are quantitatively similar to
the estimates presented here and are available on request.
We conclude from these results that additional local government spending per capita of about
20% over a four-year period improved the re-election probability of local incumbent parties in the





The original contribution of this paper is to provide the ￿rst estimates of the link between gov-
ernment spending and electoral outcomes based on a regression discontinuity design. We ￿nd
that extra local public spending per capita of about 20% over a four year period increased the re-
election probability of the incumbent party by about 10 percentage points. Existing results suggest
that the extra public spending also had positive effects on education outcomes and earnings, which
we tend to interpret as indirect evidence of public service improvements. Together, these results
suggest that expected electoral rewards encouraged incumbents to spend additional funds in ways
that were valued by voters, a ￿nding in line with agency models of electoral accountability.
As with any empirical study, an important question regards the generalizability of these ￿nd-
ings. The effects presented in this paper (as in any regression discontinuity analysis) apply only
to the units near the relevant cutoffs￿in our case, the municipalities near the population cutoffs.
Because our results are qualitatively similar across the ￿rst three cutoffs, it seems likely that the
effects presented here generalize at least to the subpopulation of municipalities in the approxi-
mate population range 8’500-18’700, which represents about 30% of Brazilian municipalities at
the time.
We would also argue that our focus on government spending, rather than taxation, is less re-
strictive than it might seem at ￿rst because political decentralization around the world has typically
not been accompanied by decentralization of revenue-raising, with the result that most of local
42In addition to the jump at the cutoff, there are also other jumps of similar magnitude visible in the graph. These might
re￿ect other policies that use other cutoffs for targeting, or they might occur simply by chance. In either case, what matters
most is that there is in fact a jump exactly where we would expect to see one based on the research design.
27spending is ￿nanced by grants from the central or state governments (Rodden 2004). However,
examining electoral responses in other contexts is an obvious avenue for future research.
289 References
Akhmedov, A. and E. Zhuravskaya, 2004, ￿Opportunistic Political Cycles: Test in a Young
Democracy Setting,￿ The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119: 1301￿1338.
Ames, B., 1994, ￿The reverse coattails effect: Local party organization in the 1989 Brazilian
presidential election,￿ American Political Science Review 88(1): 95-111.
Barro, R. J., 1973, ￿The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model,￿ Public Choice, 14: 19-42.
Besley, T., 2006, Principled Agents? The Political Economy of Good Government, Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Brender, A., 2003, ￿Theeffect of￿scal performanceonlocal governmentelectionresults inIsrael:
1989-1998,￿ Journal of Public Economics, 87: 2187-2205.
Brender, A. and A. Drazen, 2008, ￿How do Budget De￿cits and Economic Growth Affect Re-
election Prospects? Evidence from a Large Panel of Countries,￿ American Economic Review,
98(5): 2203-2220.
Brollo F., Nannicini T., Perotti R. and G. Tabellini, 2010, ￿The Political Resource Curse,￿ NBER
Working Paper 15705.
Caselli, F. and G. Michaels, 2009, ￿Do Oil Windfalls Improve Living Standards? Evidence from
Brazil,￿ unpublished manuscript.
De Carvalho, J. A. M., 1997, ￿Demographic Dynamics in Brazil, Recent Trends and Perspec-
tives,￿ Brazilian Journal of Population Studies, 1: 5-24.
Delli Carpini, M. X. and S. Keeter, 1996, What Americans Know About Politics and Why It
Matters, Yale University Press.
Drazen, A. and M. Eslava, 2010, ￿Electoral Manipulation via Voter-Friendly Spending: Theory
and Evidence,￿ Journal of Development Economics, 92(1).
Eckstein, H., 1975, ￿Case Study and Theory in Political Science,￿ in H.I. Greenstein and N.W.
Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co.
29Ferraz C. and F. Finan, 2008, ￿Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil·s Publicly
Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes,￿ Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123: 703-745.
￿￿,￿￿, 2010, ￿Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audit Reports of
Local Governments,￿ American Economic Review.
Ferejohn, J. A., 1986, ￿Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control,￿ Public Choice, 30: 5-26.
Hahn, J., P.Todd, andW.vanderKlaauw, 2001, ￿Identi￿cationandestimationoftreatmenteffects
with a regression-discontinuity design,￿ Econometrica 69: 201-209.
Hagopian, F., 1996, Traditional Politics and Regime Change, Cambridge University Press.
Hines, J. R. and R. H. Thaler, 1995, ￿Anomalies: The Flypaper Effect,￿ Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 9(4): 217-26.
Imbens, G.W., and T. Lemieux, 2008, ￿Regression discontinuity designs: A guide to practice,￿
Journal of Econometrics 142(2): 615-635.
InstitutoBrasileirodeGeogra￿aeEstat￿stica, 2002, ￿EstimativaspopulacionaisdoBrasil, grandes
regioes, unidades da federacao e munic￿pios,￿ IBGE background paper, Rio de Janeiro.
Jones, M. P., Meloni O. and M. Tommasi, 2009, ￿Voters as Fiscal Liberals: Incentives and Ac-
countability in Federal Systems,￿ unpublished manuscript.
Kitschelt, H. and S. I. Wilkinson, 2007, ￿Citizen-Politician Linkages: An Introduction, ￿ in Her-
bert Kitschelt and Stephen I. Wilkinson, eds., Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of De-
mocratic Accountability and Political Competition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
pp.1￿49.
Kinzo, M.D.A.G., 1993, ￿Consolidation of democracy: Governability and political parties in
Brazil,￿ in M.D.A.G. Kinzo (Ed.), Brazil: The challenges of the 1990s. 138-154. London:
British Academic Press.
Lee, D. S., 2008, ￿Randomized experiments from non-random selection in U.S. House elections,￿
Journal of Econometrics 142(2): 675-697.
30Lee, D. S. and T. Lemieux, 2009, ￿Regression Discontinuity Designs in Economics,￿ NBER
Working Paper 14723, February, 2009.
Levitt, S. D. and J. M. Snyder, 1997, ￿The impact of federal spending on House election out-
comes,￿ The Journal of Political Economy 105(1): 30-53.
Litschig, S., 2008a, ￿Three Essays on Intergovernmental Transfers and Local Public Services in
Brazil,￿ PhD dissertation, Columbia University.
￿￿, 2008b, ￿Rules vs. Discretion: Evidence from constitutionally guaranteed transfers to local
governments in Brazil,￿ UPF Working Paper 1144.
￿￿, 2011, ￿Financing Local Development: Quasi-experimental Evidence from Municipalities
in Brazil, 1980-1991,￿ Universitat Pompeu Fabra Working Paper 1143.
￿￿ and K. Morrison, 2008, ￿Intergovernmental Transfers and Electoral Outcomes: Quasi-
Experimental Evidence from Brazilian Municipalities, 1982-1988,￿ unpublished manuscript,
presented at the APSA meetings in Boston MA.
Mainwaring, S., 1991, ￿Politicians, parties, and electoral systems: Brazil in comparative perspec-
tive,￿ Comparative Politics 24(1): 21-43.
Manacorda, M., Miguel, E. and A. Vigorito, 2011, ￿Government Transfers and Political Support,￿
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 3:1-28.
Matsusaka, J. G., 2004, For the Many or the Few: The Initiative, Public Policy, and American
Democracy, Chicago University Press.
McCrary, J., 2008, ￿Manipulation of the Running Variable in the Regression Discontinuity De-
sign: A Density Test,￿ Journal of Econometrics, 142(2).
MoisØs, J.A., 1993, ￿Elections, political parties and political culture in Brazil: Changes and con-
tinuities,￿ Journal of Latin American Studies 25(3): 575-611.
Muszynski, J. and A. M. Teixeira Mendes, 1990, in De Geisel a Collor: O balanco da transicªo,
ed. Bolivar Lamounier, Sao Paulo: Editora Sumare.
31Niskanen, W., 1975, ￿Bureaucrats and Politicians,￿ Journal of Law and Economics, 28:617-644.
Peltzman, S., 1992, ￿Voters as Fiscal Conservatives,￿ Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107:325-
345.
Persson, T.andG.Tabellini, 2000, PoliticalEconomics: ExplainingEconomicPolicy, Cambridge,
MA, MIT Press.
Pop-Eleches, C. and G. Pop-Eleches, 2012, ￿Targeted Government Spending and Political Pref-
erences,￿ Quarterly Journal of Political Science, forthcoming.
Rodden, J. 2004, ￿Comparative federalism and decentralization: On meaning and measurement,￿
Comparative Politics 36(4): 481-500.
Sakurai, S. N. and N. A. Menezes-Filho, 2008, ￿Fiscal Policy and Reelection in Brazilian Munic-
ipalities,￿ Public Choice, 137:391-314.
Shah, A., 1991, ￿The new ￿scal federalism in Brazil,￿ World Bank Discussion Papers, 124, Wash-
ington, D.C.
Shidlo, G., 1998, ￿Local urban elections in democratic Brazil,￿ In H.A. Dietz, and G. Shidlo
(Eds.), Urban elections in democratic Latin America. 63-90. Lanham: Rowman & Little￿eld.
Smith, W.C., 1986, ￿The travail of Brazilian democracy in the "New republic",￿ Journal of Inter-
american Studies and World Affairs 28(4): 39-73.
SolØ-OllØ, A., and P. Sorribas-Navarro, 2008, ￿Does partisan alignment affect the electoral reward
of intergovernmental transfers?￿ CESifo Working Paper No. 2335. Munich: CESifo.
Veiga, L. G. and F. J. Veiga, 2007, ￿Does opportunism pay off?￿ Economic Letters, 96(2): 177-
182.
World Bank, 1985, Brazil: Finance of Primary Education, Washington D.C.
32Table 1: Mayor party af￿liations in 1982 and 1988
1982 1988
Party Party-type N % N %
PDS Right 2,537 64.5 444 10.4
PFL Right 1,054 24.7
PTB Right 7 0.2 333 7.8
PMB Right 58 1.4
PL Right 237 5.5
PDC Right 231 5.4
PRN Right 4 0.1
PSC Right 26 0.6
PRTB Right 8 0.2
PSD Right 2 0.1
PMDB Left 1,366 34.7 1,593 37.3
PDT Left 20 0.5 192 4.5
PT Left 2 0.1 38 0.9
PSB Left 37 0.9
PSDB Left 18 0.4
PSTU Left 1 0.0
Total 3,936 100 4,276 100.0
  Source: Tribunal Superior Eleitoral
33Table 2: Descriptive statistics (sample means)
7'500 - 44'148
                                                             Sample Full Full PDS Opp. Rural Urban
Observations 2306 1248 844 358 624 624
1980 county characteristics (IBGE)
Average years of schooling (25 years and older) 1.96 1.90 1.68 2.39 1.52 2.29
Percentage of residents living in urban areas (%) 30.0 27.9 25.8 32.8 14.8 41.7
Net enrollment rate of 7- to 14-year-olds (%) 55.6 55.5 51.4 64.5 48.9 62.1
Illiteracy rate, 15 years and older (%) 39.0 39.1 43.5 30.0 44.4 33.7
Poverty headcount ratio (national poverty line, %) 58.6 59.3 64.8 47.4 67.9 50.7
Income per capita (% of minimum salary in 1991) 77.5 75.2 65.4 96.6 58.6 91.9
Infant mortality (per 1000 life births) 88.9 88.5 97.7 70.0 96.2 80.7
GDP ('000) 2008 Reais (IPEA) 108'587 64'214 54'845 82'480 46'827 81'741
1982 Financial data (Ministry of Finance)
Total county revenue ('000) 2008 Reais 3'597 2'876 2'620 3'311 2'360 3'365
Total county revenue 1982/GDP 1980 (%) 5.3 5.6 6.1 4.6 6.2 5.0
FPM transfers/total revenue (%) 48.0 49.7 54.2 41.1 56.4 43.3
Own revenue/total revenue (%) 5.9 5.1 3.9 7.4 2.6 7.5
Other revenue/total revenue (%) 46.9 45.9 42.8 52.0 41.9 49.7
Administrative spending/total spending (%) 22.3 22.3 21.9 23.0 21.8 22.9
Education spending/total spending (%) 20.9 21.2 22.1 19.2 22.3 20.0
Housing spending/total spending (%) 19.5 17.9 18.9 16.2 15.9 20.2
Health spending/total spending (%) 9.9 10.4 11.6 7.9 11.1 9.6
Transportation spending/total spending (%) 20.9 21.8 20.0 26.0 23.2 20.2
Other spending/total spending (%) 8.5 8.5 8.2 9.3 8.2 8.6
1991 education outcomes (1991 census)
Average years of schooling (19- to 28-year-olds) 4.6 4.5 4.2 5.3 4.0 5.1
Literacy rate (19- to 28-year-olds) (%) 78.8 79.0 75.0 87.5 73.7 84.3
1991 Household income (IBGE)
Poverty headcount ratio (R$140 poverty line) (%) 60.0 60.2 65.7 47.5 69.2 51.2
Household income per capita 2008 Reais 223.6 217.4 188.7 282.9 168.7 266.3
1988 Electoral outcomes (TSE)
Re-election (party) (%) 23.0 21.6 10.8 47.8 20.4 22.9
Re-election (party, PFL88 as PDS88) (%) 42.7 42.5 40.3 47.8 44.9 40.0
   8'500 - 18'700
                                           Population range
Notes: Opposition indicates that the county was run by a mayor from an opposition party (PMDB, PDT, PT or PTB).
Rural sample: percentage of municipality residents living in urban areas < 24.8; Urban sample: percentage of municipality
residents living in urban areas > 24.8.
34Table 3: Test of discontinuities in pre-treatment covariates
Polynomial specification:      Linear        Linear      Linear      Linear    Linear
Neighborhood (%): 2 3 4 5 6
Opposition party (0/1) -0.131 -0.078 -0.049 -0.056 -0.061
(0.108) (0.092) (0.082) (0.072) (0.066)
Average years of schooling 0.057 0.173 0.202* 0.231** 0.159*
(25 years and older) (0.174) (0.137) (0.117) (0.108) (0.094)
Urban residents (%) 0.005 0.007 -0.004 0.004 -0.015
(0.045) (0.036) (0.031) (0.029) (0.025)
Net enrollment rate (%) 2.060 3.382 4.595* 4.260** 2.076
(7- to 14-year-olds) (3.821) (2.891) (2.403) (2.133) (1.890)
Illiteracy rate (%) -1.146 -1.511 -2.638 -2.886 -1.794
(15 years and older) (3.157) (2.286) (1.951) (1.782) (1.587)
Poverty headcount ratio (%) 3.895 -0.563 -1.523 -2.077 -0.186
(National poverty line) (3.733) (2.868) (2.439) (2.227) (1.948)
Income per capita (%) -0.031 0.029 0.045 0.062 0.030
(percent of minimum salary) (0.082) (0.059) (0.049) (0.045) (0.040)
Infant mortality -2.263 -3.776 -6.490 -3.910 -3.530
(per 1000 life births) (5.406) (4.506) (4.111) (3.493) (3.221)
Log current transfers 1981 0.090 0.067 0.081 0.068 0.007
(per capita) (0.093) (0.071) (0.065) (0.061) (0.056)
Log capital transfers 1981 0.027 0.097 0.097 0.062 0.064
(per capita) (0.163) (0.130) (0.127) (0.109) (0.099)
Log total revenue 1981 0.085 0.080 0.130** 0.109* 0.050
(per capita) (0.089) (0.072) (0.062) (0.057) (0.052)
Log own revenue 1981 0.498 0.464 0.411 0.348 0.299
(per capita) (0.414) (0.315) (0.258) (0.232) (0.215)













Notes: Table entries are  OLS estimates (standard errors) of discontinuities in pre -treatment covariates
using the pooled specification across the first three cutoffs described in Section 5, equation (3) in the main
text. F-statistic  tests  the   joint  null  hypothese s  of  no  discontinuities  in  any  pre -treatment  covariate.
Clustered (at the municipality level) standard errors in parentheses. Neighborhood (%) is % distance from
respective cutoff. All specifications include state fixed effects  and segment dummies . All specifications
allow for differential slopes by segment and on each side of the cutoff.Opposition party is an indicator for
whether the coun ty was run by a PDS mayor from 1982 -1988 (0) or a mayor from an opposition party
(PMDB, PDT, PT or PTB)  (1). (***, **, and *) denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively.
35Table 4: Impact on total public spending
Dependent variable: log total public spending per capita (1982-1985)
 Polynomial specification: Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Various
1
Neighborhood (%): 2  2 3 3 4 4 15
Pre-treatment covariates: N Y N Y N Y Y
Pooled cutoffs 1-3
I[X > 0] 0.173** 0.211*** 0.172*** 0.163*** 0.206***   0.184*** 0.158***
(0.076) (0.065) (0.060) (0.051) (0.055) (0.047) (0.036)
Observations 191 188 278 275 368 364 1158
R-squared 0.76 0.85 0.73 0.83 0.68 0.80 0.76
Pooled cutoffs 1-2
I[X > 0] 0.227*** 0.280*** 0.227*** 0.218***   0.231*** 0.207*** 0.208***
(0.098) (0.082) (0.078) (0.070) (0.071) (0.062) (0.046)
Observations 124 124 190 189 247 245 789
R-squared 0.75 0.85 0.74 0.82 0.73 0.82 0.77
1
st cutoff
I[pop > 10188] 0.199 0.379** 0.263** 0.267** 0.249*** 0.234** 0.248***
(0.161) (0.159) (0.113) (0.112) (0.094) (0.093) (0.057)
Observations 62 61 95 94 128 126 428
R-squared 0.84 0.90 0.85 0.89 0.81 0.86 0.80
2
nd cutoff
I[pop > 13584] 0.214 0.188 0.227* 0.258* 0.249** 0.262** 0.205**
(0.172) (0.166) (0.127) (0.135) (0.114) (0.111) (0.095)
Observations 63 63 95 95 119 119 361
R-squared 0.70 0.84 0.71 0.82 0.71 0.83 0.77
3
rd cutoff
I[pop > 16980] -0.038 -0.027 -0.008 0.023 0.073 0.091 0.094**
(0.145) (0.113) (0.122) (0.083) (0.117) (0.077) (0.045)
Observations 66 64 88 86 121 119 369
R-squared 0.84 0.93 0.82 0.92 0.67 0.84 0.77
4
th cutoff
I[pop > 23772] 0.045 0.165 0.152 0.134 0.159 0.061 0.111
(0.272) (0.184) (0.195) (0.144) (0.146) (0.115) (0.070)
Observations 44 44 69 68 96 95 353
R-squared 0.79 0.91 0.83 0.91 0.80 0.89 0.84
Notes: OLS estimations. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. Neighborhood (%) is % distance from
respective cutoff. All specifications include state fixed effects. The pooled specifications include segment dummies. Pre -
treatment covariates (1980 census) include county income per capita, average years of schooling for individuals 25 years
and older, poverty headcount ratio, illiterate percentage of people over 14 years old, infant mortality, enrollment of 7 - to
14-year-olds and percent of population living in u rban areas. All specifications allow for differential slopes or curvature
by  segment and  on  each  side  of  the  cutoff . (***,  **,  and  *)  denote  significance  at  the  1%,  5%  and  10%  levels,
respectively.
1Moving down the table from the pooled 1 -3 cutoffs to thesingle 4
th cutoff, the specifications are quadratic, quadratic,
quadratic, cubic, linear, and quadratic, respectively.
36Table 5: Impact on the probability of re-election
Dependent Variable: Incumbent party re-elected for mayor’ s office in 1988; LHS mean: 0.16, sd: 0.37
Polynomial specification: Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear
Neighborhood (%): 2 2 4 4 10 10 15
Pre-treatment covariates: N Y N Y N Y Y
Pooled cutoffs 1-3
 I[X> 0] 0.128 0.167* 0.083 0.098 0.076 0.098** 0.094**
(0.109) (0.099) (0.079) (0.072) (0.051) (0.047) (0.041)
Observations 195 195 374 374 919 919 1215
R-squared 0.01 0.18 0.01 0.13 0.01 0.16 0.18
Pooled cutoffs 1-2
 I[X > 0] 0.058 0.131 0.023 0.068 0.102 0.126** 0.112**
(0.140) (0.130) (0.101) (0.093) (0.064) (0.059) (0.053)
Observations 129 129 250 250 621 621 839
R-squared 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.16 0.18
1
st cutoff
I[pop > 10188] 0.125 0.258 0.025 0.140 0.147 0.216*** 0.153**
(0.273) (0.210) (0.157) (0.129) (0.091) (0.079) (0.068)
Observations 65 65 134 134 315 315 463
R-squared 0.24 0.27 0.01 0.25 0.02 0.23 0.22
2
nd cutoff
I[pop > 13584] -0.017 0.071 0.017 0.030 0.063 0.056 0.070
(0.187) (0.192) (0.134) (0.133) (0.089) (0.089) (0.082)
Observations 64 64 116 116 306 306 376
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.12 0.14
3
rd cutoff
I[pop > 16980] 0.143 0.233 0.223* 0.167 0.032 0.049 0.043
(0.241) (0.148) (0.123) (0.109) (0.085) (0.078) (0.070)
Observations 66 66 124 124 298 298 376
R-squared 0.23 0.28 0.04 0.17 0.02 0.15 0.18
Notes: OLS estimations. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. Neighborhood (%) is % distance
from respective cutoff.Pre-treatment covariates always include the indicator for whether the county was run by a PDS
mayor from 1982-1988 (0) or an opposition party (1). Other covariates such as average years of schooling for individuals
25 years and older , county income per capita, poverty headcount ratio, illiterate percentage of over 15 year olds, infant
mortality, school enrollment of 7 to 14 year olds and percent of population living in urban areas do not alter the estimate
of interest nor do they help reduce its standard e rror. All specifications allow for differential slopes by segment and  on
each side of the cutoff. (***, **, and *) denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
37Table 6: Impact on the probability of re-election (controlling for state effects)
Dependent Variable: Incumbent party re-elected for mayor’ s office in 1988; LHS mean: 0.16, sd: 0.37
Polynomial specification: Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear  Linear
Neighborhood (%): 2     2 4 4 10 10 15
Pre-treatment covariates: N Y N Y N Y Y
Pooled cutoffs 1-3
 I[X> 0] 0.166 0.223* 0.099 0.114 0.061 0.086* 0.081**
(0.128) (0.120) (0.083) (0.076) (0.051) (0.048) (0.041)
Observations 195 195 374 374 919 919 1215
R-squared 0.14 0.31 0.12 0.22 0.11 0.22 0.22
Pooled cutoffs 1-2
 I[X > 0] 0.085 0.180 0.047 0.074 0.090 0.105* 0.102**
(0.173) (0.163) (0.110) (0.104) (0.065) (0.061) (0.051)
Observations 129 129 250 250 621 621 839
R-squared 0.16 0.29 0.14 0.22 0.11 0.23 0.22
1
st cutoff
I[pop > 10188] 0.087 0.229 -0.001 0.132 0.132 0.203** 0.133*
(0.245) (0.218) (0.176) (0.150) (0.094) (0.085) (0.068)
Observations 65 65 134 134 315 315 463
R-squared 0.15 0.28 0.13 0.35 0.14 0.31  0.25
2
nd cutoff
I[pop > 13584] -0.002 0.076 0.052 0.056 0.072 0.056 0.073
(0.183) (0.190) (0.134) (0.133) (0.094) (0.092) (0.084)
Observations 64 64 116 116 306 306 376
R-squared 0.06 0.14 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.18   0.19
3
rd cutoff
I[pop > 16980] 0.186 0.172 0.183 0.169 0.002 0.045 0.089
(0.228) (0.223) (0.144) (0.129) (0.087) (0.082) (0.100)
Observations 66 66 124 124 298 298 376
R-squared 0.24 0.46 0.16 0.32 0.14 0.23 0.25
Notes: OLS estimations. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.Neighborhood (%) is % distance from
respective cutoff. All specifications include state fixed effects . The pooled specifications also include segment dummies .
Pre-treatment covariates always include the indicator for whether the county was run by a PDS mayor from 1982 -1988 (0)
or an opposition party ( 1). Other covariates such asaverage years of schooling for individuals 25 years and older , county
income per capita, poverty headcount ratio, illiterate percentage of over 15 year olds, infant mortality,school enrollment of
7 to 14 year olds and percent of population living in urban areas do not alter the estimate of interest and are jointly
insignificant. All specifications allow for differential slopesor curvature by segment and on each side of the cutoff . (***,
**, and *) denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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F
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0
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0
.
8
9
1
.
4
7
1
.
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4
1
.
8
6
0
.
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.
2
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.
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[
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
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[
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[
0
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4
7
]
[
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0
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[
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.
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N
o
t
e
s
:
O
L
S
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
s
.
H
e
t
e
r
o
s
k
e
d
a
s
t
i
c
i
t
y
-
r
o
b
u
s
t
 
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
e
r
r
o
r
s
 
i
n
 
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
.
 
N
e
i
g
h
b
o
r
h
o
o
d
 
(
%
)
 
i
s
 
%
d
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
 
f
r
o
m
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
c
u
t
o
f
f
.
 
A
l
l
 
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
 
s
t
a
t
e
 
f
i
x
e
d
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
 
f
o
r
 
w
h
e
t
h
e
r
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
u
n
t
y
 
w
a
s
 
r
u
n
 
b
y
 
a
 
P
D
S
 
m
a
y
o
r
 
f
r
o
m
 
1
9
8
2
-
1
9
8
8
 
(
0
)
 
o
r
 
a
n
 
o
p
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
p
a
r
t
y
 
(
1
)
.
 
O
t
h
e
r
 
c
o
v
a
r
i
a
t
e
s
 
s
u
c
h
 
a
s
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
y
e
a
r
s
 
o
f
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
i
n
g
 
f
o
r
 
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
s
 
2
5
 
y
e
a
r
s
 
a
n
d
 
o
l
d
e
r
,
c
o
u
n
t
y
i
n
c
o
m
e
 
p
e
r
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
,
 
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
 
h
e
a
d
c
o
u
n
t
 
r
a
t
i
o
,
 
i
l
l
i
t
e
r
a
t
e
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
o
v
e
r
 
1
5
 
y
e
a
r
 
o
l
d
s
,
 
i
n
f
a
n
t
 
m
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
,
s
c
h
o
o
l
e
n
r
o
l
l
m
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
7
 
t
o
 
1
4
y
e
a
r
 
o
l
d
s
 
a
n
d
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
l
i
v
i
n
g
 
i
n
 
u
r
b
a
n
 
a
r
e
a
s
 
d
o
 
n
o
t
 
a
l
t
e
r
 
t
h
e
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
 
o
f
 
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
n
o
r
 
d
o
 
t
h
e
y
 
h
e
l
p
 
r
e
d
u
c
e
 
i
t
s
 
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
e
r
r
o
r
.
 
A
l
l
 
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
a
l
l
o
w
 
f
o
r
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
i
a
l
c
u
r
v
a
t
u
r
e
 
o
n
 
e
a
c
h
 
s
i
d
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
c
u
t
o
f
f
.
 
(
*
*
*
,
 
*
*
,
 
a
n
d
 
*
)
 
d
e
n
o
t
e
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
c
e
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
1
%
,
 
5
%
a
n
d
 
1
0
%
 
l
e
v
e
l
s
,
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
.
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i
g
u
r
e
1
:
F
P
M
T
r
a
n
s
f
e
r
s
,
1
9
8
2
-
1
9
8
5
(
i
n
’
0
0
0
o
f
2
0
0
8
R
e
a
i
s
)
3
9
7
8
6
6
1
6
9
2
5
4
1
1
9
1
5
1
0
1
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1
3
5
8
4
1
6
9
8
0
2
3
7
7
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3
0
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6
4
3
7
3
5
6
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4
1
4
8
1
9
8
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o
f
f
i
c
i
a
l
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
N
o
t
e
s
:
 
E
a
c
h
 
d
o
t
 
r
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
s
 
a
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
.
 
F
P
M
 
t
r
a
n
s
f
e
r
s
 
a
r
e
 
s
e
l
f
-
r
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
 
b
y
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
i
e
s
.
 
1
9
8
2
 
o
f
f
i
c
i
a
l
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
s
 
b
a
s
e
d
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
1
9
8
0
 
c
e
n
s
u
s
 
c
o
n
d
u
c
t
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
a
l
 
a
g
e
n
c
y
,
 
I
B
G
E
.
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h
c
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c
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+
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c
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c
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c
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c
3
c
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o
p
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u
t
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m
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v
a
r
i
a
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l
e
 
(
Y
)
}
 
τ
1
}
 
τ
2
}
 
τ
3
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:
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r
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l
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r
e
q
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1
0
1
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4
1
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1
9
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o
f
f
i
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o
p
u
l
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o
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s
:
 
T
h
e
 
b
i
n
-
w
i
d
t
h
 
i
s
 
2
8
3
.
 
1
9
8
2
 
o
f
f
i
c
i
a
l
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
s
 
b
a
s
e
d
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
1
9
8
0
 
c
e
n
s
u
s
 
c
o
n
d
u
c
t
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
a
l
 
a
g
e
n
c
y
,
 
I
B
G
E
.
 
M
c
C
r
a
r
y
 
d
e
n
s
i
t
y
 
t
e
s
t
 
f
a
i
l
s
 
t
o
 
r
e
j
e
c
t
 
t
h
e
 
n
u
l
l
 
o
f
 
n
o
 
d
i
s
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
i
t
y
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
d
e
n
s
i
t
y
 
a
t
c
o
n
v
e
n
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
l
e
v
e
l
s
 
o
f
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
c
e
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
f
i
r
s
t
 
s
i
x
 
c
u
t
o
f
f
s
.
42F
i
g
u
r
e
4
:
F
i
r
s
t
s
t
a
g
e
a
n
d
i
m
p
a
c
t
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n
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l
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p
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n
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n
g
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o
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e
r
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e
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u
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.
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o
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F
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M
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l
o
g
 
t
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a
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s
p
e
n
d
i
n
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p
e
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c
a
p
i
t
a
-
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3
-
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-
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1
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0
%
-
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%
-
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-
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-
2
%
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%
6
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8
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0
%
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P
o
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u
l
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o
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c
)
/
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n
e
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C
:
 
l
o
g
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
r
e
v
e
n
u
e
 
p
e
r
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
-
.
3
-
.
2
-
.
1
0
.
1
.
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.
3
-
1
0
%
-
8
%
-
6
%
-
4
%
-
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%
0
2
%
4
%
6
%
8
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0
%
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P
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
-
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)
/
c
P
a
n
e
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D
:
 
l
o
g
 
o
w
n
 
r
e
v
e
n
u
e
 
p
e
r
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
N
o
t
e
s
:
 
A
l
l
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
a
r
e
 
s
u
m
m
e
d
 
o
v
e
r
 
t
h
e
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
 
1
9
8
2
-
1
9
8
5
 
a
n
d
 
s
c
a
l
e
d
 
b
y
 
1
9
8
0
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
c
e
n
s
u
s
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
.
 
E
a
c
h
 
d
o
t
r
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
s
 
t
h
e
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
(
p
a
r
t
i
a
l
l
e
d
 
o
u
t
)
 
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
i
n
 
a
 
g
i
v
e
n
 
b
i
n
.
 
T
h
e
 
b
i
n
-
w
i
d
t
h
 
i
s
 
1
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
p
o
i
n
t
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
 
t
h
r
e
s
h
o
l
d
,
 
c
=
1
0
'
1
8
8
,
1
3
'
5
8
4
,
1
6
'
9
8
0
.
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e
-
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e
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n
d
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s
c
o
n
t
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n
u
i
t
y
p
l
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-
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2
-
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%
-
8
%
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6
%
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4
%
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%
0
2
%
4
%
6
%
8
%
1
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%
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o
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o
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N
o
t
e
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:
 
E
a
c
h
 
d
o
t
 
r
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
s
 
t
h
e
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
(
p
a
r
t
i
a
l
l
e
d
 
o
u
t
)
 
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
i
n
 
a
 
g
i
v
e
n
 
b
i
n
.
 
T
h
e
 
b
i
n
-
w
i
d
t
h
i
s
 
1
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
p
o
i
n
t
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
 
t
h
r
e
s
h
o
l
d
,
 
c
=
1
0
'
1
8
8
,
1
3
'
5
8
4
,
1
6
'
9
8
0
.
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